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Abstract When humans and animals estimate numbers of
items, their error rate is proportional to the number. To
date, however, only humans show the capacity to represent
large numbers symbolically, which endows them with
increased precision, especially for large numbers, and with
tools for manipulating numbers. This ability depends criti-
cally on our capacity to acquire and represent explicit sym-
bols. Here we show that when rhesus monkeys are trained
to use an explicit symbol system, they too show more pre-
cise, and linear, scaling than they do using a one-to-one
corresponding numerosity representation. We also found
that when taught two diVerent types of representations for
reward amount, the monkeys systematically undervalued
the less precise representation. The results indicate that
monkeys, like humans, can learn alternative mechanisms
for representing a single value scale and that performance
variability and relative value depend on the distinguishabil-
ity of each representation.
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Introduction
Many studies indicate that humans are innately endowed
with an approximate non-symbolic representation of num-
ber and that an analogous approximate numerosity system
is present in other animals, which is adaptive for comparing
and evaluating food sources, threats, and social situations
(Dehaene 1997). Untrained human infants and macaques
behave as if they naturally assess and keep track of the
number of fruits or conspeciWcs (though only for quite
small numbers; Hauser et al. 2000). The psychophysics of
approximate numerosity judgments are remarkably similar
in humans and animals, in that both show magnitude-
dependent variations in accuracy (Dehaene 1997); i.e. it is
more diYcult to distinguish 8 objects from 9 objects than it
is to distinguish 1 object from 2 objects, even though both
pairs diVer by 1. Thus the standard deviation of approxi-
mate numerical estimates increases in proportion to the
magnitude being estimated (Krueger 1982), a property that
Gibbon called scalar variability (1977). In this way, judg-
ment of approximate numerosity in both humans and ani-
mals is similar to more fundamental sensory processes in
that the threshold for discrimination between two stimuli
scales with their magnitude (Weber 1843).
The increasing discrimination threshold with numerosity
magnitude has been interpreted in two ways: (1) that num-
erosity is internally represented by a linear ‘accumulator’
whose variability is proportional to the accumulated
amount (Gibbon 1977; Whalen et al. 1999). (2) That the
internal representation of numerosity is logarithmically
compressed, with constant variability, so that larger num-
bers are subjectively closer together on a mental ‘number
line’ (Dehaene and Mehler 1992; Dehaene 1997). Although
it is debated which of these models best explains the way
numerosities are internally represented (Cantlon et al.
2009; Dehaene et al. 2009), it is clear that the approximate
number sense shows scalar variability, a feature common to
many, seemingly more fundamental, sensory perceptions.
Most human cultures have, in addition, developed sym-
bol systems for representing numerosity exactly—i.e. much
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older approximate number sense. Symbol systems allow us
to discriminate smaller proportionate diVerences than we
could for the same numbers of items; e.g. 99 vs 100, and to
manipulate quantities using memorized abstract rules.
Although chimps, monkeys and parrots can learn to associ-
ate Arabic numerals (or number words) with numbers of
items (Ferster 1964; Matsuzawa 1985; Washburn and
Rumbaugh 1991; Pepperberg and Gordon 2005), few have
so far exhibited any beneWt to using such symbolic, rather
than one-to-one correspondence, representations. One ben-
eWt to an animal of using symbolic representation was
shown by Boysen and Hallberg (2000), who found that
chimpanzees presented with two sets of objects, in a task
where they were given the unchosen number of reward
items, were unable to suppress choosing the larger number
of items, but when the two reward amounts were repre-
sented by numerals, they were able to choose the smaller
numeral and receive the larger reward. Furthermore, Mat-
suno et al. (2006) showed that chimpanzees who had
learned color symbols could make more precise color dis-
criminations than chimpanzees who had not. Here we com-
pare the behavior of highly trained macaque monkeys in
discriminating numerals versus dots arrays representing the
same system of value; we Wnd that monkeys using symbols,
compared to using the corresponding numbers of items,
show substantially increased choice accuracy.
Materials and methods
Four juvenile male rhesus macaque monkeys participated
in these experiments beginning training at 1 year of age. In
a compartment of each home cage, a touchscreen monitor
(Elo TouchSystems, Menlo Park, CA) was mounted at eye
level with a stainless steel juice delivery tube just below.
Software for stimulus presentation, reward delivery, data
collection, and data analysis were written in MatLab (Math-
works, Natick, MA). Pairs of stimuli were presented on the
left and right side of the monitor. Each stimulus numerosity
was randomly chosen from the values 0–21, with the con-
straint that the two values could not be the same. The
numerals were 5 cm in height, and the circles containing
the dots were 9 cm in diameter. For the dot stimuli, visual
features such as dot size, dot color and dot position (within
a circular boundary) varied randomly; the dots were drawn
so that when two dots overlapped they diVered in color, and
the smaller dot was drawn in front; thus all the dots were
easily seen and discriminable by a human observer, even
for the highest numbers of dots. For the shapes control task
the dots were replaced by diVerently colored shapes; for the
equal area task the total area covered by the dots was con-
strained to be constant. The elements were not allowed to
overlap in either the shapes or the equal area conditions.
For the numerals, the letters X Y W C H U T F K L N R
were used to represent numbers 10–21 because we chose
not to use double digits; we will therefore refer to them as
‘numerals’.
The animal chose one of the two stimuli by touching the
screen within 2.25 cm of the center of the stimulus. He was
always rewarded by the same number of drops as the num-
erosity of the chosen stimulus; the drops were delivered at
4 Hz, each drop accompanied by a beep sound. Each stimu-
lus pair was presented for 10 s or until the animal
responded by touching either stimulus. A new stimulus was
presented 3 s after the end of the preceding trial. Each mon-
key was allowed to work, alone, for at least 3 h per day, and
they usually stopped working after 2 h, or 300–400 trials.
For the Wrst 3 months of training, they were given ad lib
water during non-test periods, and juice rewards. After they
stopped taking the free water in their cages and were drink-
ing predominantly the juice provided during test periods,
we switched the reward to water and stopped providing
Xuids before the daily testing period. We oVered water in
the afternoon, after testing, but the monkeys usually did not
take any; their daily Xuid intake was always more than
30 ml/kg. They always had ad lib food and have been
steadily gaining weight.
The monkeys were trained alternately on choosing
between pairs of numerals and pairs of dot patterns. They
started with 0 and 1 and progressed to the next higher num-
ber when their performance on the highest number
reached >75% averaged over all possible combinations
with other numbers, for both dots and numerals. The
reward pulses were long (yielding several drops per pulse)
when the maximum numbers were small, and decreased in
length as the monkeys attained larger maximum numbers.
They reached a stable level of performance for both dots
and numerals from 0 to 21 after 4 months of training. Then
they were tested on 0–21 for both dots and numerals, on
alternate days, for 1 month to ensure that their performance
was stable, and then tested for 2 months to obtain the data
presented here (Fig. 1). Control experiments (Fig. 3) were run
subsequently. Only data from the Wrst 200 trials each day,
excluding the Wrst 10 trials, were used for analysis because
after 200 trials the monkeys usually started playing around
and working sporadically, and during the Wrst few trials the
experimenter was still in the room, which distracted them.
Because the monkeys were allowed up to 10 s to make a
choice before the next stimulus was presented, their reac-
tion times could be as long as 10 s, but histograms of their
reaction times for the Wrst 200 trials each day peaked at less
than 600 ms, with a long tail extending homogeneously
from 1 to 10 s. This long tail means that average reaction
times, as well as the harmonic means and medians, were
biased toward longer durations than the peak of the reaction123
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than 800 ms to calculate the plots in Fig. 2b–d.
All experiments were done in accordance with proce-
dures approved by the Harvard Medical School Standing
Committee on Animals.
Results
To study the association between the approximate analog
number system and the precise symbolic representation of
numerosity, we trained juvenile macaque monkeys to asso-
ciate Arabic numerals and dot arrays with reward amount.
We found that monkeys could easily learn dot-array numer-
osity and abstract symbolic representations of surprisingly
high numerosities when we directly associated the symbols
or the numerosities with reward amounts (Washburn and
Rumbaugh 1991; Beran et al. 2008) using an automatic
touch-screen apparatus. For several hours each day, in a
section of their home cages, the monkeys were given
choices between two simultaneously presented number
stimuli; they chose one by touching it and were given the
same discrete number of drops of juice as the chosen
option. That is, there was no ‘wrong’ or ‘right’ choice, but
the reward was proportional to the chosen number, so
choosing the larger option was presumably better than
choosing the smaller. The two choices presented were ini-
tially two Arabic numerals or two sets of dots randomly
positioned inside a circle (Fig. 1a, b). The monkeys soon
began to choose the larger of the two dot-array numerosi-
ties or the larger numeral (even though they were rewarded
for choosing either side), so far for pairs from 0 to 21. Most
interestingly, the monkeys, like humans, were more accu-
rate when using numerals to represent the number of drops
of juice reward than when using the seemingly more direct
and intuitive one-to-one representation of dot-array numer-
osity. The monkeys’ accuracy is impressive: for most
choice pairs the monkeys chose the larger number almost
every time, except for consecutive pairs of large numbers,
like 21 vs. 20 (Fig. 1c, d).
Fig. 1 Young monkeys distinguish surprisingly large numerosities.
a Monkey using a touchscreen to choose 10 dots in preference to 9 dots
(the large yellow dot appears where he touches the screen). The dots
vary in color, size, and position randomly (the colors are much more
distinct from each other than they appear on this video image). The
monkey’s mouth is on the juice tube. b Monkey choosing the numeral
9 in preference to 8. c Average performance choosing between two dot
patterns for 4 monkeys on alternate days over a 2-month period
(»6,000 trials per monkey). The color of each square in the matrix
indicates the percentage of trials in which the monkey chose the num-
ber corresponding to the square’s vertical position over the number
corresponding to its horizontal position. Thus all the squares in the up-
per left represent trials when the monkey chose the larger numerosity
over the smaller, and the squares in the lower right show trials when
the monkey chose the smaller numerosity. Note the increasing number
of ‘errors’ for proportionately smaller diVerences between choices.
d Average performance for choosing between two numerals for 4 mon-
keys on alternate days over a 2-month period (»6,000 trials per mon-
key). The same data replotted, at a reviewer’s request, graphically; the
fraction of times the larger numerosity (e) or numeral (f) was chosen as
a function of the diVerence between the two choices, divided by the
larger choice. The standard deviation of the error function for choices
between dot patterns (g) and numerals (h). The dotted red lines show
the best linear Wt to the data, with the 95% conWdence intervals indi-
cated by thin red lines. i Scales for dots (top) and numerals (bottom)
compressed so that the standard deviations in g, h are constant on that
scale; the scales were calculated from the best Wtting lines in g and h
123
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showed more mistakes (choosing the smaller numerosity)
when the diVerence between the two choices was small com-
pared to their size (Fig. 1c); that is they showed scalar vari-
ability. When the monkeys chose between symbols (Fig. 1d),
however, although they still tended to make more errors for
small numerical diVerences, their inaccuracy did not scale
with choice magnitude. To quantify this diVerence between
choice behavior for numerals versus dots, we measured the
fraction chosen for each numerosity, as a function of the
diVerence between that numerosity and every other choice.
We then Wt a normal cumulative distribution function (error
function) to each curve; the width of this distribution for each
numerosity, the sigma of each function, is plotted in Fig. 1g
for each dot numerosity and in Fig. 1h for numerals. These
plots conWrm that for dots the performance curves are dis-
tinctly broader for increasing numerosities, but this broaden-
ing with magnitude is almost absent for numerals.
Supposing that the relationship between response vari-
ability and numerical magnitude reXects a compression of
the underlying number scale (hypothesis 2 in the introduc-
tion), we distorted the two number scales so that the stan-
dard deviations would be constant on that scale. This
distortion results in a scale that is relatively more com-
pressed at higher numerosities for dots than is the compara-
ble scale for numerals (Fig. 1i). However, these data do not
directly address the question of whether the diVerence in
behavior between numerals and dot arrays depends on
diVerences in underlying scale.
The monkeys responded faster when at least one of the
choices was large, compared to when both choices were
small, probably reXecting higher motivation for choosing
large numerosities (Fig. 2a, b). The fact that the monkeys’
reaction times decreased, instead of increasing, with
increasing number of dots indicates that they were not
counting the dots. This is consistent with a study on a chim-
panzee who learned to match numbers of dots to Arabic
numerals, who also did not show increasing reaction times
for increasing numbers of dots (Murofushi 1987). Reaction
times also varied with choice diYculty, measured as the
proportional diVerence between the two choices; i.e. with
the diVerence between the choices divided by the larger
choice, consistent with previous studies on monkeys using
dot arrays (Brannon and Terrace 2000; Fig. 2c). This
dependence on the diVerence between choices was true
even when choice pairs were restricted to those with diVer-
ences between 1 and 10 and maximum numerosities >11
(in order to rule out the possibility that faster choices for
larger diVerences reXected maximum choice size rather
than choice diYculty; Fig. 2d). The monkeys consistently
chose slightly faster for dot pairs than for numeral pairs,
though the diVerence was quite small (<20 ms).
We asked whether, for the dot arrays, the monkeys were
basing their choices on the number of dots, or whether they
relied on some low-level visual attribute. Two control
experiments using patterns of random shapes (Fig. 3a), or
patterns of dots in which the total dot surface area was
always constant (Fig. 3c), indicate that the monkeys based
their dot array choices on numerosity and not on low-level
visual attributes. This is consistent with more extensive
studies showing that monkeys preferentially base their
judgments on numerosity in situations like this (Cantlon
and Brannon 2007).
Since the monkeys learned independently to choose
between dots-vs-dots or numerals-vs-numerals, we consider
3 increasingly abstract scenarios for what they learned: 1)
two independent matrices of pairwise choices, 2) two inde-
pendent rank orders, or 3) the number of drops of juice, or the
hedonic value, symbolized by each stimulus. Monkeys can
learn to rank order quite long lists of numerosity-based or
arbitrary visual stimuli, and they can show transitive infer-
ence from one list to another (Treichler and Van Tilburg
1999; Terrace et al. 2003; Treichler et al. 2003). Nevertheless,
Fig. 2 a Histograms of reaction times less than 1 s for 4 monkeys
choosing between pairs of dots (red) or pairs of numerals (green) for
the quartile of choices in which the sum of the two choices was less
than 10 (top); between 10 and 21 (second panel); between 21 and 32
(next to last panel); or smaller than 42 (bottom). b Average reaction
times (§sem) as a function of the size of the larger of the two choices
for dots (open circles) and numerals (solid circles). c Average reaction
times (§sem) as a function of the numerical diVerence between the two
choices divided by the larger choice, for dots (open circles) and numer-
als (solid circles). d Average reaction times as a function of the abso-
lute diVerence between the two choices for choice pairs in which the
maximum choice was at least 11 and the diVerence between choices
was between 1 and 11. For panels b–d, averages were calculated using
only reaction times less than 800 ms123
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learned two independent matrices of pairwise choices or two
independent rank orders because when they were Wrst pre-
sented with choices between one numeral and one dot array
(Fig. 3e), they immediately started to choose, accurately, the
larger one, irrespective of modality. This means they recog-
nize dot numerosity and numerals as representing equivalent
scalar values, for surprisingly large and precise amounts.
Intuitively it seems obvious that it would be more diY-
cult to distinguish 20 dots from 21 than to distinguish the
corresponding numerals, but is this because numerals and
numerosities are scaled diVerently in our brains, as has been
proposed for approximate versus precise numerosity repre-
sentations in humans (Dehaene et al. 2008). We cannot tell
whether the monkeys treat the numerals as representing
numerosity, because we do not know how they quantify the
reward: they could use number of drops, amount of juice,
reward duration, or a more abstract hedonic scale. But, as
discussed earlier, our controls (Fig. 3a–d) and the results of
previous studies (Cantlon and Brannon 2007) indicate that
monkeys do use the numerosity of dot arrays to make dot
choices; therefore either they treat the numerals as equiva-
lent to numerosities, or the numerals and the dot numerosi-
ties are each independently equivalent to some scalar
measure of juice or hedonic value. In either case this
hedonic scale, whatever it represents, is mutually equiva-
lent to both numerosity and the learned numeral symbols,
so we now consider the mapping of the two diVerent repre-
sentations, dots vs numerals, to this scale.
We Wrst calculated the ‘perceptual’ equivalence for dots
and numerals, following the approach of Weber (1843). To do
this, we assumed that Weber’s perceptual just-noticeable-
diVerence is proportional to the sigma of the error function.
We then plotted the distance along each number scale corre-
sponding to the cumulative number of standard deviations, for
dot arrays and numerals separately (Fig. 4a). Because dis-
criminability was dependent on magnitude for dots but not for
numerals, the diVerence between two choices corresponding
to a given perceptual increment depends on magnitude for
dots, but not for numerals; i.e. the perceptual value of numer-
als increases almost linearly with increasing magnitude, but
the perceptual value for dot arrays falls oV with magnitude
(Fig. 4a). This was Fechner’s insight: if perceptual value is
correlated with discriminability, and discriminability of a
Wxed stimulus diVerence decreases with stimulus magnitude
(Weber 1843), then the perceptual response must fall oV with
stimulus magnitude (Fechner 1860). That the perceptual value
of dot arrays, but not numerals, should fall oV with stimulus
magnitude is counterintuitive in our case since the hedonic
value of any numerosity should be the same irrespective of
whether it is represented by a numeral or dot array.
In Fig. 4b, we plot the relative value of each number of
dots compared to each numeral, from 0 to 21, derived
from the curves plotted in Fig. 4a. Counterintuitively, this
Fig. 3 Generalization and abstraction behavior of monkeys trained to
associate dot arrays and numerals independently with the correspond-
ing number of drops of juice. a Monkey choosing 12 shapes over 10.
The stimuli are shapes of diVerent colors (the colors were more distinc-
tive than they appear on this video image). b Average performance of
4 monkeys for the Wrst 2 days on this task. c Equal-area control, total
dot area was always constant. The monkey chooses 21 small dots
instead of 3 large dots. d Average performance of 4 monkeys for the
Wrst 2 days of the equal-area control task. e Transitivity of dot array
learning and numeral learning. The monkey chooses the numeral N
(= 20 drops) over 10 dots (= 10 drops). f Average performance of 4
monkeys over the Wrst 4 days on the numeral vs. dots choice task. Their
average performance did not change over the 4 days123
716 Anim Cogn (2010) 13:711–719calculation predicts that twenty-one dots should be less
‘valuable’ to a monkey than the ‘numeral’ R, even though
both represent 21 drops of juice. Therefore, given a choice
between R and 21 dots, the monkeys should slightly prefer
R. We tested this prediction using the task illustrated in
Fig. 3e in which the monkeys chose between a dot array
and a numeral: the same four monkeys were tested for
4 weeks on the dots-vs-numerals task. We calculated for
each dot numerosity the proportion of times each possible
numeral choice was made, and vice versa. Then for each
dot numerosity and for each numeral, we Wt an error func-
tion to the data and calculated the 50% choice probability,
which gives us a numeral equivalent for each dot numeros-
ity, and vice versa (Fig. 4c). The monkeys’ equal choice
behavior fell along the dots = digits identity line (dotted
line) for small numbers, but at higher numerosities the
monkeys tended to undervalue the dots compared to the
numerals, as predicted by our calculation (Fig. 4b) based on
their dots-vs-dots and numeral-vs-numeral choices.
We then asked whether a simple model of numerosity
discrimination based only on scalar variability could
explain the diVerence between dots and numeral valuations.
We did a Monte Carlo simulation of the numeral-vs-dots
choice based on the monkeys’ dots-vs-dots or numeral-vs-
numeral choice accuracy. Each numeral or dot number was
assigned a ‘value’ randomly drawn from a Gaussian choice
probability with a sigma based on the data in Fig. 1g and h.
The model then chose whichever stimulus had the higher
‘value’. Not surprisingly the model accurately reproduced
the variability in the dots-vs-dots and numeral-vs-numeral
choice behavior in Fig. 1c and d (not shown), but the model
also reproduced the undervaluation of dots at the higher end
of the choice range (Fig. 4d). Therefore, the degree of sca-
lar variability for the two visual representations alone can
explain the fall oV in estimated value for large numbers of
dots and the compressed dot valuation scale.
Discussion
The monkeys in this study learned to use both arbitrary
symbols and the number of dots in a display to represent
reward amount. They showed compressed valuation when
estimating numbers of dots but essentially linear valuation
of numerals. The former behavior is common to humans
and other animals (Dehaene 1997), but linear symbolic
number comprehension is thought to be unique to educated
humans (Dehaene et al. 2008).
Is numerosity comprehension required for any of the
behaviors in this study? There are two reasons to believe
that numerosity was indeed the cue on which the monkeys
based their dot-array choices: (1) When initially tested with
dot arrays in which the total dot area was constant or with
arrays of arbitrary shapes, the monkeys immediately chose
the larger numerosity, indicating that numerosity, rather
than some low-level visual cue, was critical to their value
judgments. (2) Cantlon and Brannon (2007) showed that
even in the presence of other options, like color or shape,
monkeys preferentially choose to categorize stimuli by
their numerosity. Therefore, let us assume that the monkeys
assigned a value to each dot pattern based on dot numeros-
ity. Interestingly, the monkeys comprehended the numeros-
ity of a dot array without depending on low-level visual
cues, yet the reaction-time results indicate that they do so
without counting the dots. The reaction-time results further
suggest that the mental process of comprehending the num-
erosity of a dot array is slightly easier for the monkeys than
is recognizing and evaluating learned symbols.
Fig. 4 Perceived value equivalence for dot numerosity and numerals.
a Correspondence between the number of sigmas (of the error func-
tion) and stimulus numerosity for dots (open circles) and numerals
(Wlled circles) based on the sigmas calculated for panels g and h in
Fig. 1, using only dots-vs-dots and numerals-vs-numerals choice
behavior. b Predicted equivalence between dot and numeral values
based on dots-vs-dots and numerals-vs-numerals choice behavior. The
ratio of dot value to numeral value was calculated from panel (a) for
each numerosity 0–21. c Behavioral measure of dots vs numeral val-
ues based on numeral-vs-dots choice behavior. Filled circles show the
numeral value that is behaviorally equivalent to each dot numerosity,
and open circles show the number of dots equivalent to each numeral.
The dotted line is dots = numerals. d Modeled value equivalents for
numeral-to-dots matching using a Monte Carlo simulation (1,000,000
trials) with the same probability distribution as the behavioral distribu-
tion for dot-to-dot or numeral-to-numeral matching in Fig. 1 g and h;
Wlled circles = numeral equivalent to each dot number; open
circles = dot equivalent to each numeral. Note that both the monkeys’
behavior and the predicted behavior show an underestimation of the
value of dots compared to numerals at the highest numerosities123
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uate the numerals. Just because we used numerals to repre-
sent reward amount does not mean that the monkeys treated
the numerals, like the dots, as numerosity cues. Several
species of non-human primates have been taught to rank
order large numbers of arbitrary images, including numer-
als (Brannon and Terrace 1998; Terrace et al. 2003; Inoue
and Matsuzawa 2007), and intuitively there is no reason to
think that numerosity comprehension should play any role
in this behavior. However, the monkeys in our study did,
without explicit training, treat the dot arrays and the numer-
als as interchangeable representations for the same reward
scale; i.e., the number of drops of juice.
It is not surprising that our monkeys should have
regarded the two symbolic representations as interchange-
able since we explicitly trained them to use both systems
with the exact same reward scale. Previous studies have
shown that monkeys can spontaneously interchange numer-
osity cues and ordinal value in rank order tasks, indicating
an intuitive appreciation that analog quantities can corre-
spond to ordinal position (Harris et al. 2007). Our study
diVers from the extensive studies on list learning in
macaques (Treichler and Van Tilburg 1999), in which the
goal is to avoid any detectable diVerential reward associa-
tion for each item, in order to Wnd out if monkeys can
appreciate an ordinal relationship among items without any
other cue than the knowledge of which item is rewarded in
pairwise presentations. In our study, instead, we made it as
clear as possible, using discrete juice drops and accompa-
nying sounds, that each number was diVerentially, and
uniquely, rewarded. That is, in list-learning studies the
question is whether monkeys posses the cognitive capacity
to learn rules and infer an underlying scale from conditional
2-choice discriminations, but here we explicitly provided a
linear analog scale they could associate with the diVerent
visual stimuli.
Educated humans have a linear appreciation of a sym-
bolic number scale, a non-linear appreciation of numeros-
ity, and the ability to correlate the two representations. It is
usually assumed that our linear symbolic number under-
standing is correlated with, and inXuences, our non-linear
approximate number sense, as a consequence of repeated
experience associating numbers of items or amounts with
numerals. But our approximate number sense remains non-
linear even though our understanding of numerals is linear.
Our linear understanding of numerals is distinct from our
approximate number sense in other ways: Most of us know
instantly that 99 cents is more than 98 cents without imag-
ining two piles of pennies and mentally comparing them–
that kind of associative link would be less accurate and
slower than people normally are. Furthermore, even with
extensive experience using precise linear symbolic repre-
sentations for numerosity, people tend to underestimate
large numbers of items, guessing that 100 dots are fewer
than half that number (Krueger 1982; Izard and Dehaene
2008), even while presumably being able to diVerentiate
precisely any pair of large numerals.
Dehaene has proposed that these diVerences indicate that
we have two distinct number representations: a non-linear
approximate number sense and a precise linear symbolic
number sense that is achieved through education (Dehaene
1997; Dehaene et al. 2008). Understanding the links
between these two distinguishable functions is, of course,
complicated in humans by the myriad ways we learn to
associate them, so our monkey behavior can provide a sim-
pliWed model. Our monkeys’ associations between numer-
als and numerosities show some of the same hallmarks of
the link between humans’ approximate and symbolic num-
ber systems. First, of course, is the diVerence in their vari-
ance. Second, even though the monkeys did not show
increasing inaccuracy with increasing numeral magnitude,
they did show slower reaction times for smaller numerical
diVerences, as do humans (Moyer and Landauer 1967).
Third, the monkeys systematically undervalued the larger
numerosity dot arrays compared to the numerals, despite
the repeated association of each with equivalent rewards.
This is analogous to the observation that educated adult
humans, despite decades of training associating numerosity
and numbers, grossly underestimate the number of dots in a
display, for numerosities between 10 and 100 (Izard and
Dehaene 2008).
One explanation for both our monkeys’ behavior, and
much about human numerosity behavior, is that numerosity
is a perception, a sensory process (Burr and Ross 2008;
Ross and Burr 2008), and, like other fundamental sensory
processes, it shows magnitude-dependent variability. The
monkeys’ numeral behavior did not show scalar variability,
and therefore likely does not depend on numerosity com-
prehension. Instead we propose that the degree of discrimi-
nability of symbols governs the linearity and accuracy of
their scalar associations. A reviewer argued that this diVer-
ence could be regarded as a ‘methodological quirk’ in that
each dot numerosity could be represented by a variety of
conWgurations with occasional overlap of dots, whereas
each numeral was always the same. When anyone, animal
or human, estimates the number of objects they are less
accurate for larger numerosities, and this is presumably
because as you increase the number of objects, among other
things, the objects do pile up in diVerent conWgurations and
can occlude each other. So, yes, the number of possible
conWgurations and possible overlap doubtless contribute to
the scalar variability we observed, but the scalar variability
of numerosity perception has been exhaustively shown not
to be a methodological ‘quirk’, but rather a fundamental
feature of the way humans and animals estimate the num-
bers of objects (Dehaene et al. 2004). One could make the123
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using the same dot conWguration for each numerosity, but
then one would no longer be presenting numbers of objects,
but rather symbols. Indeed it has been argued that number
of possible conWgurations between large and small numbers
of objects may underlie the phenomenon of subitizing—
two objects always form a line, three objects always form a
triangle, but Wve objects can have numerous conWgurations
(Mandler and Shebo 1982).
Adult humans estimating large numbers of items show
increasing errors for proportionately smaller diVerences,
but our accuracy using numerals is almost entirely indepen-
dent of number magnitude, i.e. it is linear. Very young chil-
dren, however, do show reduced accuracy in comparing
increasingly large numerals (Sekuler and Mierkiewicz
1977). These results have been interpreted as indicating that
humans have an innate compressed, or logarithmic, scaling
of numerosity, which later becomes associated with a more
linear symbolic representation (Dehaene et al. 2008).
Indeed young children place 30 near the middle of a 1–100
number line; but they shift between second and fourth
grade to a linear mapping (Siegler and Opfer 2003). This
suggests that either education or maturation causes a com-
pressed to linear shift in number mapping. Because remote
Amazonians untrained in the use of numerals above 5 retain
compressed numerosity maps as adults (Dehaene et al.
2008), it has been concluded that education must be respon-
sible for the compressed to linear shift in humans. It has
been proposed that experience with measurement or with
addition and subtraction brings about the realization that all
consecutive numbers are separated by the same interval,
and the realization that the number scale is therefore linear.
However, because our otherwise uneducated macaque
monkeys show linear discrimination when using symbolic
representations, we propose that a linear map is not
imposed on children by the repeated use of linear tools, like
rulers, or by learning addition, but rather that linear map-
ping arises from the equal distinguishability of one symbol
from another.
Our results also suggest an explanation for why educated
adults systematically underestimate large numbers of items.
The monkeys undervalued the dots relative to the numerals
at larger numerosities, even though both were associated
with the same reward scale. Previous work has shown that
scalar variability in a sensory modality results in a percep-
tual scale that is logarithmic, or otherwise compressed with
increasing magnitude (Fechner 1860; Stevens 1961), but
the scales are either arbitrary or relative in magnitude. Here
we show, using a simple Monte Carlo simulation, that
given two sensory inputs and a mutual Wnite value calibra-
tion, the modality with the larger scalar variance will be
increasingly undervalued with magnitude.
In monkeys, as in educated humans, the correlation
between approximate numerosity perception and more pre-
cisely discriminable symbolic representations can dissoci-
ate in characteristic and predictable ways, depending on the
perceptual discriminability of the representations.
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